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MARKET SHARE - A TALE OF TWO CENTURIES
Aaron D. Twerski*
In 1980 market share descended like a bombshell on the
American legal scene in response to a problem of considerable
magnitude. The California Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories1 faced the specter of dismissing claims against the
manufacturers of DES even though they were negligent in the
manufacturing and marketing of a drug that caused cancer in
the daughters of the users.2 The crux of the problem was that
several hundred manufacturers had produced and marketed the
drug in the early forties. Some three decades had passed from
the time that the drug was first taken until the time that the
cancers developed in the children of the DES takers. The pas-
sage of time made it virtually impossible to identify which man-
ufacturer was responsible for any given injury. It was clear that
there was a significant amount of fault based injury caused by
DES in the world at large. And there was no way in which any
plaintiff could point her finger at any given defendant and say
"you are the cause of my injury."
It is not my function in this setting to express my opinion as
to whether holding a defendant liable to the amount of its mar-
ket share is an appropriate response to the problem. Courts and
commentators have spoken to both sides of that issue.3 Instead,
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. Beth Midrash Elyon Research Insti-
tute; B.S. 1970 University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D. 1965 Marquette University.
1 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
2 In Sindell, there was no factual finding of negligent testing and marketing of DES.
The defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds that plaintiffs could not iden-
tify which among the eleven named defendants had caused her harm. For a good descrip-
tion of the evidentiary base which supports a finding of negligent testing and marketing
of DES, see Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 322, 333, 43d N.Y.S.2d 625, 628-29,
634-35 (1st Dep't 1981), aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
3 Several courts have directly adopted Sindell or some variation thereof. In addition
to Sindel, see, e.g., McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass.
1985); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D. 1983), affd on other
grounds, 739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp.
1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd in part, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 173 MII. App. 3d 1, 527 N.E.2d 333 (1988); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash.
2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37,
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I should like to address the tensions which have tugged at the
courts in seeking to fashion the market share remedy. As I see it,
the market share saga up until the recent decision of the New
York Court of Appeals in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.4 demon-
strates that the courts throughout the country have had their
feet firmly planted in two different centuries - one foot in the
nineteenth century and the other in the twenty-first century.
Hymowitz is the first case to resolve the tensions with clarity
and without paying senseless obeisance to tradition. It is the
first market share case that reads well.
I. EXPOSING THE TENSIONS
A. The Size of the Market
Sindell, the first of the market share decisions, simply failed
to address how the market would be defined. If a defendant was
to be held liable for its percentage of the market there was a
need to know whether the market was the city of Los Angeles,
the state of California, or the United States of America. After
years of agonizing, California finally decided that the percentage
is to be calculated on the basis of sales in the national market.'
cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). For
favorable commentary, see Note, Market Share Liability: A New Method of Recovery
for D.E.S. Litigants, 30 CATH. UL. REv. 551 (1981); Note, Market Share Liability: An
Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REv. 668 (1981).
A substantial number of courts have, however, rejected the market share approach
even in the DES cases. See, e.g., Mizelli v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C.
1981); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc). The attempt to apply market share to the asbestos litigation has been met with
hostility. See Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985), for a full listing of
the cases. See also Bateman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1986)
(court rejected market share liability theory in asbestos case). For negative commentary
on market share, see Fischer, Products Liability - An Analysis of Market Share Liabil-
ity, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1623 (1981); Note, Market Share Liability - The California Rou-
lette of Causation Eliminating the Identification Requirement, 11 SroN HALL L. REV.
610 (1981).
73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied sub nom. Rexall
Drug Co. v. Tigue, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
Technically the decision to utilize a national market in California appears to have
been agreed upon by stipulation of the parties. Reference to the stipulation is found in
In re DES Litigation, No. 830-109, General Order No. 12 (Aug. 16, 1985), at 2. The
inference in Hymowitz that this was decided by the California courts appears to be
erroneous.
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Hymowitz has also wisely opted for the national market.,
Why has it taken so long for this issue to be resolved? More
important, why have some courts still not seen the light? In
Martin v. Abbott Laboratories,7 the Washington Supreme Court
opted for the narrowest definable market. Very simply, accord-
ing to the Washington court, if the DES was purchased from a
particular pharmacy (e.g., Joe's Pharmacy), and that pharmacy
had purchased its DES from five manufacturers, then the mar-
ket share would be calculated based on the percentage of sales
to a single pharmacy. Why would any rational court choose the
Joe's Pharmacy market over a national market? It is obvious
that such a narrow definition of the market does violence to the
fundamental market share, liability theory. A defendant who
pays a high percentage on a narrow market today on the hap-
penstance that there is sufficient evidence to link it to a particu-
lar pharmacy will be taxed again in a later case where such a
narrow definition of the market is impossible.8 Market share re-
quires that markets be fairly defined for all cases if the theory is
to meet even a pretense of even handedness.
That the courts have had difficulty in resolving the market
size issue is explained by the two-century tug that I made men-
tion of earlier. Traditionally, causation required the plaintiff to
identify the defendant that was the cause of the plaintiff's par-
ticular harm. Market share was a radical departure from that
traditional norm. Under the new approach, causation would be
decided by how much harm was caused in the aggregate in the
world at large by three hundred manufacturers. Targeting sev-
eral manufacturers out of three hundred for liability was most
uncomfortable. The chance that the real culprit was made to pay
was remote. If the pool was limited to five defendants who sold
the drug to a particular pharmacy, plaintiffs were no longer su-
ing the immediate world. The case appears more circumscribed
B Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
7 192 Wash. 2d 581, 605, 689 P.2d 368, 383 (1984). Martin was somewhat ambiguous
as to how the market was to be determined. The ambiguity was cleared up in George v.
Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 592, 733 P.2d 507, 512 (1987), where the court held that
"the relevant market for determining liability be as narrow as possible." In Smith v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 173 M11. App. 3d 1, 527 N.E.2d 333 (1988), the court appears to also have
adopted a narrow geographic market test.
8 Fischer, supra note 3, at 1643-44.
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and more traditional.' Of course, on reflection, it makes little
difference if four non-causal defendants out of a pool of five are
made to pay or two hundred ninety-nine out of a pool of three
hundred. Logic did not easily emerge the victor over tradition.
B. Ability of Defendant to Prove Itself Out of the Case
Closely related to the market size question is whether a de-
fendant can free itself from paying its market share if it can es-
tablish that it was not responsible for the harm to the particular
plaintiff. Until Hymowitz, the courts have answered the ques-
tion in the affirmative. 10 With all due respect to the courts, I
believe that this position is arrant nonsense. Market share posits
the view that causation will be viewed writ large over a broad
market. Of what importance is it that a defendant establishes
that it did not sell a particular pill to a particular patient? Not
only is it irrelevant to market share theory, it cuts against the
fair administration of it. A defendant who exits a particular case
because by chance it can establish that it did not sell to a partic-
ular pharmacy, dumps its percentage of the harm upon other
defendants who cannot prove the negative. Those defendants
end up paying a disproportionate share of the costs of DES
harm." Furthermore, the costs of litigating individual causation
are very high. Defendants who have the defense available to
them, expend large sums of money for the detective work neces-
sary to establish the defense. And courts must decide whether
" As the pool of defendants becomes smaller, the analogy to more established and
traditional case law becomes closer. It will be recalled that the courts have refused to
apply alternative liability based on Summer v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 189 P.2d 1 (1948), to
resolve the DES identification problem because the number of manufacturers who pro-
duced DES was so large that the chance that a particular producer caused the injury at
hand was remote. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 603, 607 P.2d 924,
931, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 139, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at
506, 539 N.E.2d at 1074, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 946. Courts have, in special circumstances, been
willing to overcome the defendant-identification issues. In all such cases there were a
limited number of defendants. See, e.g., Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282
F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Nichols
v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451
(1953).
10 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 499 U.S. 912 (1980); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash.
2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37,
cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
" Fischer, supra note 3, at 1644.
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they have met their burden of establishing no causation. And all
this for what?
Ultimately, the court's fumblings of this issue is explainable
only because it made them feel better that in they were paying
their dues to the "nineteenth century causation club." It is as if
they were saying "Now we really aren't that radical after all. If
you can prove that you did not cause harm to this particular
plaintiff, we will let you walk." Old doctrine really does die hard.
That Hymowitz has refused to play this charade is to its credit.
It has honestly faced the fact that market share cannot be rec-
onciled with traditional causation theory.
C. Joint and Several Liability
Yet a third issue gives evidence of the two-century tug.
Courts have been forced to struggle with the relationship be-
tween market share liability and the common law joint-
tortfeasor doctrine. What is to be done if after all the allocation
of market share is done, only 60% of the national market can be
accounted for? Who bears the loss of the missing 40% of the
market? The missing percentage may be explained by defend-
ants who are insolvent and by shares of the market that can sim-
ply not be accounted for as a result of proof problems.' 2 Plain-
tiffs contend that classic joint tortfeasor rules (or some variant
thereof) should govern. Defendants argue that market share and
the joint-tortfeasor doctrine do not fit together.
I have yet to hear a plausible argument for joint tortfeasor
liability in the market share setting. The classic argument sup-
porting joint tortfeasor liability is that each tortfeasor is the
proximate cause of the entirety of plaintiff's harm.13 Given an
innocent plaintiff and a defendant who was the cause of the
plaintiff's entire harm, it is argued that the defendant should
not be allowed to escape liability merely because another
12 See Rheingold, The Hymowitz Decision - Practical Aspects of New York DES
Litigation, 55 BROOKLYN L R v. 883, 893-95 (1989).
11 For a spirited defense of the common law joint tortfeasor doctrine emphasizing
the point made in the text, see Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsi-
ble Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and
Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 1141 (1988). This author responded in Twerski,
The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response to the Critics, 22 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1125 (1989).
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tortfeasor turns out to be insolvent.14 In the case of market
share liability that argument simply does not wash. A market
share defendant is not the cause of the plaintiff's entire harm.
Indeed, the defendant is most often not the cause of any harm
to the individual plaintiff. The only grounds for holding the de-
fendant liable is that it contributed to a certain percentage of
harm to the entire world and should pay its fair share of the
damages in each individual case. No defendant bears any legal
relationship to any other defendant in the case. All of the courts
have found that there is no factual basis to support a finding of
a common law conspiratorial tort. By what act of legerdemain
can one defendant be held for the damage of another?
Once again the difficulties that the courts have faced with
this issue stem from' the attempt to "traditionalize" market
share liability and make it appear as if it were a slight variation
on the theme of classic liability. The protestations of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Brown v. Superior Court15 notwith-
standing, it was quite clear that Sindell did contemplate joint
tortfeasor liability.16 Brown spelled an outright retreat from the
untenable position of Sindell. The Hymowitz court has correctly
14 See Wade & Smith, Fairness: A Comparative Analysis of the Indiana and Uni-
form Comparative Fault Acts, 17 IND. L. REV. 969, 963-76 (1984).
1 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1072-76, 751 P.2d 470, 485-87, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 426-28 (1988).
16 The argument of the Brown court that Sindell did not address the joint-
tortfeasor issue rings hollow. The contention of the plaintiff that the requirement of
Sindell that a "substantial share" of the market is required as a predicate to market
share is explainable only by the imposition of joint-tortfeasor liability is very strong. The
presence of a "substantial share" of the market makes it less onerous on each defendant
who will be required to pay for absent market shares. The court's response to this argu-
ment was that a substantial share was mandated by Sindell to diminish the injustice of
shifting the burden to defendant to prove that they could not have made the substance
which injured the plaintiff. Though Sindell did offer the rationale it makes absolutely no
sense whatsoever. Of what significance is it to a 10% market share defendant that here is
another 50% of the market in the case as defendants? Why does the presence of addi-
tional defendants make it less onerous on the 10% than it would be if the other defend-
ants were not named?
The Brown court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that by specifically providing
for cross complaints against other manufacturers the court sought to assure that joint-
tortfeasors have a mechanism available to recover from other defendants if they bore a
disproportionate share of liability. The Brown court responded by suggesting several
other reasons for providing a procedure for impleading other defendants. The reasons
proferred by the court are strained if not simply implausible.
The court would have been far better off if had it said that in Sindell it had not
fully thought through the implications of combining market share with joint-tortfeasor
liability and that on further reflection they do not mesh well together.
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followed suit. There is simply no reason why the risk of insol-
vency should fall on defendants, unrelated to each other in no
way other than that they are parties named in the same caption
of a law suit, rather than on plaintiffs. Both plaintiffs and de-
fendants are legally strangers to the insolvent defendants. Ab-
sent traditional causation and absent any legal relationship be-
tween defendants, there is no rationale which can support the
assessment of full or inflated damages against any market share
defendant.17
II. Tim FRACTIONALIZATION OF THE LAW OF TORTS
The question that is uppermost on the minds of the practic-
ing bar is what is the long-term effect of Hymowitz? How far
can it be extended? My own sense is that Hymowitz will be re-
stricted to its facts. A more interesting question is whether the
courts will continue to fractionalize the law of torts.
A. Whereto Market Share
It is not likely that the market share theory will spread like
wildfire to free plaintiffs from having to meet their traditional
burden of identifying the guilty defendant in product liability
litigation. The case law throughout the country demonstrates
that the courts have been unwilling to push market share be-
yond the very special facts of the DES litigation.-8 Hymowitz
made it unmistakably clear that the New York court has no in-
tention of expanding the scope of market share. The court said:
17 It should be noted that the Hymowitz decision not only rejected joint-tortfeasor
liability but also rejected the concept of "grossing-up," by which each defendant's sev-
eral liability would be increased proportionally so that plaintiff would recover 100% of
her damages. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 513, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The
court earlier had described the complex procedure adopted by the court in Martin v.
Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984), and George v. Parke-Davis,
107 Wash. 2d 584, 733 P.2d 507 (1987), which provides that defendants who are not able
to prove their market share have their share of the market inflated so that plaintiffs
receive a 100% recovery.
18 It has been disapproved in asbestos litigation, see Thompson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984); Hannon v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1983); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543
F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 200 Cal. App.
3d 250, 246 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1988); Celotex v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985); and in
DPT cases; Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155, 561 A.2d 511 (1989); Senn v.
Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215 (1988).
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"We stress .. that the DES situation is a singular case, with
manufacturers acting in a parallel manner to produce an identi-
cal, generically marketed product, which causes injury many
years later, and which has evoked a legislative response reviving
previously barred actions."'19 It is thus highly unlikely that mar-
ket share will be extended to non-generic products,20 to products
that do not have latency periods,2 or to situations where plain-
tiffs have simply failed to secure the evidence which would have
permitted them to identify the defendant. 22 That the Hymowitz
court took the trouble of noting that DES was the subject of
direct legislative action is of considerable interest. It is the kind
of language which a court inserts to provide future litigants with
an argument that DES was sui generis and cannot be used to
expand the common law in the usual incremental fashion.
B. Proportional Liability
For the present, it is clear that market share is a theory of
rather limited utility. What remains to be decided is how far
courts will go in proportionalizing liability. Market share is not
an isolated phenomenon in the law of torts. It is part of a gen-
eral tendency to deal with difficult proof problems by assigning a
percentage to the issue in question and calculating damages ac-
cording to the percentage. Admittedly, the kinds of cases to
which proportionalization has taken place are not of one cloth.
The policy ramifications differ substantially depending on the
issue. Nonetheless, the fractionalization of tort liability can no
longer be viewed as a series of discrete phenomena. In addition
to market share, the following areas have either been propor-
tionalized or are considered to be prime candidates for
proportionalization.
19 Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 508, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947 (emphasis
added).
20 See asbestos cases et al., supra note 18, and Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal.
App. 3d 583, 192 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1983).
21 See Sheffield, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 594, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 877, setting forth that
market-share should not be applied when "the delay in discovering the alleged causation
was in no way related to the nature of the defective product or any other act or omission
of the unknown tortfeasor."
22 Long v. Krueger, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
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1. Comparative Fault
At last count, some 43 states have adopted some form of
comparative fault.y In many jurisdictions, reasonable assump-
tion of the risk (a non-fault concept) is treated as a form of com-
parative fault or comparative responsibility.2' A strong majority
applies comparative fault or comparative responsibility concepts
to strict products liability cases2' even though they freely admit
that comparing the faulty conduct of the plaintiff with the no-
fault defect of the manufacturer is conceptually flawed.20
2. Joint Tortfeasor Liability
A natural outgrowth of the comparative fault phenomenon
was the application of a fault percentage comparison among de-
fendants in working out their relative liabilities in contribution
actions. A large number of states' legislatures have now acted
to limit the liability of joint tortfeasors to the fault percentage
allocated to each individual defendant.28 In some states, the abo-
See generally V. SCHWARTZ, Cohi m 'AVE NEGLIGENCE § 3.1-3.5 (2d ed. 1986); H.
WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 1.11, 4.14.13 (2d ed. 1987).
21 See, e.g., Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); W.M. Bashlin Co. v.
Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982); Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Ihn. 23, 192
N.W.2d 826 (1971); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86; 515 P.2d 821 (1973).
25 See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (1979); Daly v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). See also V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, § 12.2, listing thirty states that apply comparative fault to
strict products liability cases.
26 Thode, Comparisons in Products Liability, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 3; Twerski, The
Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REv. 797
(1977).
27 The leading case is Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). Contribution according to fault percentage is provided for in the
Uniform Comparativi Fault Act, section 4 (1979), 12 U.L.A. 39, 49 (Supp. 1989), and by
the statutes of numerous jurisdictions. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2502 (Supp.
1989); MiHc Comp. LAWS § 600.2925b (1986); N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L, & R. § 1502 (McKinney
1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 832 (West 1988); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.445 (1989); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2102 (Purdon 1962).
I Of 34 states that have somewhat modified the common-law joint tortfeasor doc-
trine, ten have abolished joint tortfeasor liability for both economic and noneconomic
losses. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(d) (1989); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (Supp.
1988); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (1987); IDAHO CODE § 6-803(3) (Supp. 1989); IND.
CODE ANN. § 344-33-5 (West Supp. 1988); KA'. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (Supp. 1987);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.2-02-03 (Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2740 (1987); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988). Two abolition states
allow joint liability if the fault of the tortfeasor exceeds 50%. See IOWA CODE ANN. §
668.4 (West 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(2) (1989). One other state provides that
1989]
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lition of the joint tortfeasor doctrine has been limited to non-
economic loss,29 and in others the abolition of the doctrine takes
place only when the defendant's fault is below a certain percent-
age of total fault.30 Nonetheless, the availability of easy percent-
age apportionment has had the effect of sharply limiting the
workings of the classic common law joint tortfeasor doctrine.
3. Seat Belt Cases
Many courts have applied comparative fault or apportion-
ment principles to reduce the verdicts of plaintiffs who have suf-
if the fault of any defendant is less than 50%, that defendant cannot be liable for more
than twice the fault allocated to her. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-8-15.1 (Supp. 1989).
For a comprehensive review of the statutes enacted as of the date of this Article, see
Pressler & Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Case for Reform, 64 DE.N, U.L. REv.
651, 656-59 (1988).
29 A good number of states have only eliminated the joint tortfeasor doctrine for
noneconomic loss (i.e., pain and suffering). See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1431 to 1431.5
(West Supp. 1989) (added by Proposition 51, approved by electorate on June 3, 1986);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(3) (West 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 1 2-1117 (1989) (defend-
ant over 25% at fault is jointly and severally liable); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1600 (Mc-
Kinney 1986) (defendant over 50% at fault jointly and severally liable); Omo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1987) (applies only when plaintiff is at fault).
A recently enacted New Jersey statute sets forth an interesting compromise. The
statute states:
Except as provided in subsection d. of this section, the party so recovering may
recover as follows:
a. The full amount of the damages from any party determined by the trier of
fact to be 60% or more responsible for the total damages.
b. The full amount of economic damages plus the percentage of noneconomic
damages directly attributable to that party's negligence from any party deter.
mined by the trier of fact to be more than 20% but less than 60% responsible
for the total damages.
c. Only that percentage of the damages directly attributable to that party's
negligence from any party determined by the trier of fact to be 20% or less
responsible for the total damages.
d. With regard to environmental tort actions, the party so recovering may re-
cover the full amount of the damage award from any party determined to be
liable.
e. Any party who is compelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek
contribution from the other joint tortfeasors.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West 1989) (amended 1987).
Several states have followed the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and have enacted
reallocation statutes which reallocate uncollectible shares among all the responsible par-
ties, including the plaintiff if the plaintiff were negligent. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN, §
604.02 Subd. 1 (West Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 537.067, 538.230, 538.300 (Vernon
1988 & Supp. 1989). Michigan applies its reallocation statute only if the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent. See MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304 (West 1987).
30 See statutes cited in notes 28-29 supra.
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fered greater injury because they have failed to wear their seat
belts.3" There has been considerable confusion as to whether the
reduction is to be accomplished based on causation principles3 2
or is to be reckoned using a more general comparative fault ap-
proach."3 Courts that have not insisted on a rigid separation of
first and second collision injuries as a necessary perquisite to as-
sessing plaintiffs fault seem to have created a unitary "cause-
fault" reduction which blurs the discrete issues.34
4. Proximate Cause
Under classic tort doctrine whether a defendant is or is not
the proximate cause of a plaintiff's harm is an all or nothing
question.35 The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, however, sug-
gests that in comparing the fault of plaintiff and defendant, that
proximate cause may legitimately factor into the percentage of
fault allocated to each party. 6 It takes no great leap in imagina-
tion to apply this reasoning to cases where plaintiff fault is not
involved. Thus, the Model Uniform Product Liability Act pro-
vides that where a non-claimant misused a product in a manner
in which the product seller could not anticipate the plaintiff's
recovery against the manufacturer of the defective product be
reduced to the extent that the misuse was the cause of the
11 See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1984);
Lowe v. Estate Motors, Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706, reh'g denied, 429 Mich.
1207 (1987); Waterson v. General Motors Corp., 111 N.J. 238, 544 A.2d 357 (1988); Spier
v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974); Foley v. City of West
Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
3" See, e.g., Waterson v. General Motors Corp., 111 N.J. 238, 544 A.2d 357 (1988),
and Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974). For an
excellent discussion of the differing approaches to seat-belt damages reduction, see Note,
A Compromise Between Mitigation and Comparative Fault?: A Critical Assessment of
the Seat Belt Controversy and a Proposal for Reform, 14 HoFsTRA L. RIv. 319 (1986).
See, e.g., Lowe v. Estate Motors, Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706, reh'g de-
nied, 429 Mich. 1207 (1987); Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d
824 (1983).
"See, e.g., Lowe v. Estate Motors, Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706, reh'g de-
nied, 429 Mich. 1207 (1987); Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d
824 (1983).
,' See generally W. PRossER & W. KETON, PaossEa & KEETON ON Ton's § 42 (5th
ed. 1984). But see Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging
Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L REv. 403 (1978).





5. Protecting the Chance Interest
The prototype for this category is Hershovits v. Group
Health Cooperative of Puget Sound.3 8 In that case, plaintiff's
decedent had consulted defendant for a bad cough. The doctor
negligently failed to diagnose lung cancer. Approximately six
months later, the cancer was properly diagnosed. Expert testi-
mony established that had the plaintiff been timely diagnosed
when his cancer was at Stage 1, his chances for five-year survival
would have been 39%. His chances for survival at Stage 2 when
the cancer was finally diagnosed were only 25%. The defend-
ant's negligence had, effected a 14% reduction of plaintiff's
chance for survival. Scholars have argued that damages should
be calculated on the basis of the percentage reduction caused by
the defendant's negligence."' Again, it takes no imagination to
recognize that such "chance apportionment" could be put into
place whenever causation becomes a thorny issue. In some cases,
such proportionalization would be more favorable to plaintiffs
then would be the case if classic causation concepts governed
and in others defendants would be favored. 40 In any event, pro-
portionalizing cause will dramatically alter the legal landscape in
tort litigation.
6. The Indeterminate Plaintiff
Yet another possible occasion for proportionalizing cause
was raised by Judge Jack Weinstein in the famous Agent Orange
37 MODEL UNIF. PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 112(c) and (d), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,740
(1979).
" 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
" King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Pre-
existing Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); Robinson, Mul-
tiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982).
The approaches of King and Robinson are not identical. King would hold defendants
liable for the present value of the increased risk that the victim bears because of expo-
sure. Robinson would allow recovery based on risk contribution or probability of
causation.
40 Whenever plaintiffs are unable to establish liability by a more probable than not
standard, they would benefit from a propositional causation rule. If they can meet the
traditional standard the adoption of proportional causation will reduce recovery from
what it is under present law.
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litigation.41 In that case, the court noted that defendant might
have been able to establish that the use of Agent Orange in Viet-
nam was responsible for an increased number of cancers to vet-
erans over and above that which could be expected from a ran-
dom group of persons not exposed to the toxic agent. However,
no individual plaintiff might be able to prove that his cancer was
a result of the exposure to the Agent Orange rather than a ran-
dom cancer. If we assume that plaintiffs can establish a higher
incidence of cancer for those exposed to the cancer-causing toxic
agent, some form of proportional recovery might be fashioned to
reflect the harm actually caused by the defendant.,2 The inde-
terminate plaintiff cases are, of course, a mirror image of the
indeterminate defendant cases which brought about the market
share theory. If defendants are to be charged for the harm which
they brought about to the world at large even though cause can-
not be established for any individual injury, there is no good
reason that the selfsame logic should not be utilized to force de-
fendants to pay when proof problems do not permit an individ-
ual plaintiff to demonstrate that his particular harm was caused
by the defendant's toxic agent. If cause to the world becomes the
basis for proportional recovery, in one case there is a strong ar-
gument for proportional recovery in the other.
Ultimately, I have serious doubts that the move to propor-
tionalization is wise.43 That does not mean that I believe that
defendants who have brought about injury in situations where
classical cause cannot be established should walk away scot free.
Alternative compensation systems will have to be developed to
deal with the kinds of tragedies which they have brought about.
The attempts to proportionalize have not been effective. Some
nine years after Sindell, we are still bogged down in complex
and costly litigation. Injured plaintiffs will see too little too late.
Legal costs will devour a significant portion of the final recov-
eries. Ultimately, market share has failed because it has at-
tempted to graft a novel theory of recovery against a matrix of
tort concepts which do not easily mesh with it.
" In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 833.42
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
42 Id. at 837-39.
,3 For a thorough discussion of the practical and jurisprudential difficulties caused
by proportionalization, see Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to
Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L REv. 1473 (1986).
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Courts cannot be faulted for seeking proportional solutions
to otherwise intractable problems. They cannot be expected to
sit back and turn seriously injured claimants away without some
hope that other responsible governmental agencies will step into
the breech. If market share was a necessary evil, then Hymowitz
provides the clearest guidelines for its administration. However,
I believe that mass tort litigation cannot proceed with a pot-
pourri of classic tort law and radical resolution of causation re-
lated problems. We cannot continue to live in a tort world that
straddles two centuries.
